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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
INTERNATIONAL

TAXATION-HEDGING-GAINS

AND

LOSSES RESULTING FROM HEDGING IN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCIES
MAY BE CHARACTERIZED As ORDINARY GAIN OR Loss EVEN IF SUCH
HEDGING Is NOT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE BUSINESS WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE CORN PRODUCTS DOCTRINE

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1967 the British government devalued the pound as against
the dollar. The year 1969 witnessed the floating of the German
mark. More recently the dollar has fluctuated widely in international money markets. Under presently accepted accounting principles United States multinational corporations are required to
convert their foreign assets and liabilities into dollars at the
year's end rate of exchange.1 When a foreign currency is devalued
against the dollar, the value of that foreign subsidiary's assets
also declines. In a corporation's consolidated financial statement
such a drop in value may distract investors from the corporation's
operating successes, with a corresponding loss of prestige in the
investment community. 2 The corporate response to this dilemma

has been to "hedge" against currency devaluations by making forward purchases of currency futures contracts.3 This paper exam1. "To incorporate foreign currency transactions and foreign currency
financial statements in its financial statements an enterprise must... express
in its reporting currency all assets, liabilities, revenue, or expenses that are measured in foreign currency or denominated in foreign currency .
" 3 AICPA
Professional Standards, AC § 1083.003 (1977).
2. In many cases, the devaluation results in a huge loss in the value of the
subsidiary's assets. Such an extraordinary loss, which appears on the consolidated financial statement without explanation, may frighten potential investors
away from that corporation. Corporations engage in currency hedges to offset
devaluation losses and to preserve their financial equilibrium.
3. "Futures contracts" are contracts in which one party promises to sell to
another a specified amount of a commodity at a particular price in the future. A
"forward purchase" (or short sale) is the making of such a contract by a party
who does not actually have the commodity (in this case, currency) on hand. A
"forward purchase of a currency futures contract," then, is the present promise
by one party to sell to another party a specified amount of another currency at a
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ines the proper tax characterization of gains and losses produced
by currency futures hedging. To benefit from tax advantages, corporations attempt to characterize gains and losses from hedging
activities as either ordinary or capital, depending on their parfinancial situation. Wrestling with this problem in Hoover
ticular
4

Co. and American Home Products Corp. v. United States,5 the

courts refined and clarified holdings from the earlier related cases
of Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner6 and Interna7
tional Flavors & FragrancesInc. v. Commissioner.
H.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The foundation case in determining whether gain or loss from
hedging transactions in commodity futures constitutes ordinary
or capital gain or loss is Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner." In this case Corn Products Refining Co. (CPC) bought
corn futures in order to insure a supply of raw corn from which it
manufactured distilled corn products. Although CPC made a
profit in 1940, it suffered a loss in 1942 from its futures trading.
When calculating its tax liability, CPC reported these gains and
losses as ordinary income. CPC later attempted to recharacterize
these futures contracts as "capital assets" under section 117 of
the 1939 Internal Revenue Code." This would cause gains and
losses to be treated as the products of sales of capital assets and
result in a tax benefit for CPC. In support of this recharacterization, the company contended that its futures contracts were
"property" separate and distinct from its manufacturing operaparticular rate.
4. 72 TAX CT. REP. DEc. (P-H) 113 (1979).
5. 601 F.2d 540 (1979).
6. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
7. 62 T.C. 232 (1974).
8. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
9. Sec. 117(a)(1) states:
The term "capital assets" means property held by the taxpayer (whether
or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include stock in
trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be
included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, or property, used in
the trade or business of a character which is subject to the allowance for
depreciation provided in section 23(1) .

. ..

Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 117(a)(1), 53 Stat. 50 (now I.R.C. § 1233).
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tions. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, agreeing with
the Tax Court and the Second Circuit that the futures transactions were an integral part of CPC's business, not separate and
distinct from its operations. The Court found that Congress's
purpose in granting preferential treatment to capital assets under
section 117 was to avoid "excessive tax burdens on gains resulting
from a conversion of capital investments . . . -"o Congress did
not, however, intend to exempt transactions which were "the normal source of business income."1 1 Thus, the doctrine emerging
from Corn Products was that gains or losses from commodities
futures transactions that are integral parts of the corporation's
business must be characterized as ordinary income. The applicability of the Corn Products doctrine came into question in the
InternationalFlavors & Fragrancescase.1 2 In 1966 International
Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. (IFF) had become concerned that the
British government might devalue the pound, which would lower
the value of IFF's holdings in its British subsidiary. To cover its
net exposure, 3 IFF purchased a currency futures contract. Two
weeks before the delivery date, but after the November 1967
pound devaluation, IFF sold its futures contract to another bank.
IFF claimed that because the gain was realized from the sale of a
capital asset held for more than six months, it should be treated
as a long-term capital gain under section 1233(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code.1 4 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) made two

10. 350 U.s. 46, 52 (1955) (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106
(1932)).

11. 350 U.S. at 52.
12. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 232 (1974).

13. "Net exposure" describes a parent corporation's possible loss if a foreign
subsidiary's native currency is devalued. Net exposure may be calculated by
multiplying the net assets exposed to risk by a fraction representing the parent's
ownership interest precentage. "Net assets exposed to risk" are computed by

subtracting from the subsidiaries' total assets the liabilities in the native currency, the fixed assets of the subsidiary, and the liabilities payable by that subsidiary in other currencies. Hoover Co., 72 TAX CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 113, 118
(1979).
14. The pertinent portions of § 1233 are:
(a) CAPITAL ASSETS-For purposes of this subtitle, gain or loss
from the short sale of property shall be considered as gain or loss from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset to the extent that the property, including a commodity future, used to close the short sale constitutes a capital
asset in the hands of the taxpayer.
(b) SHORT-TERM GAINS AND HOLDING PERIODS-If gain or
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alternative arguments. First, the IRS contended that the transaction at issue was not a bona fide sale, but rather a purchase by
IFF through the bank of the pounds needed to meet its obligations. This, the IRS asserted, constituted a short-term capital
gain under section 1233(b). 15 The IRS's second argument was that
IFF's futures contract, although technically a capital asset within
section 1221's definition,"' was not a true capital asset under the
Corn Products test. Accordingly, the IRS asserted that under the
Corn Products doctrine the gain was ordinary income. The majority of the Tax Court accepted the IRS's second position without
reaching the merits of the first argument. Three judges dissented,
claiming that Corn Products was inapplicable because the property involved in this transaction, British currency, was not a norloss from a short sale is considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset under subsection (a) and if on the date of such
short sale substantially identical property has been held by the taxpayer
for not more than 1 year. . . or if substantially identical property is acquired by the taxpayer after such short sale and on or before the date of
the closing thereof(1) any gain on the closing of such short sale shall be considered as
a gain on the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for not more
than 1 year ....
For purposes of this subsection, the acquisition of an option to sell property at a fixed price shall be considered as a short sale, and the exercise or
failure to exercise such option shall be considered as a closing of such
short sale.
(d) LONG-TERM LOSSES-If on the date of such short sale substantially identical property has been held by the taxpayer for more than 1
year, any loss on the closing of such short sale shall be considered as a loss
on the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year ....
(g) HEDGING TRANSACTIONS-This section shall not apply in the
case of a hedging transaction in commodity futures.
I.R.C. § 1233. (Except as otherwise noted, all references are to the 1954 Code.)
15. Id.

16. Section 1221 defines capital assets as property held by the taxpayer
whether or not connected with his trade or business but excludes: (1) stock in
trade or other property usually inventoried by the taxpayer at the end of the tax
year or property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business; (2) property subject to depreciation under section 167 or real property
used in business; (3) copyrights or similar property; (4) certain notes receivable;
(5) certain United States notes payable; and (6) certain publications of the
United States government. I.R.C. § 1221.
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mal source of IFF's income. 17 Judge Tannenwald, however, concurred with the majority on entirely different grounds. The
concurrence reasoned that since the bank was acting as an agent
of IFF, there had been no bona fide sale of the futures contract.
Therefore, the resulting income should be treated as short-term
capital gain.18 On appeal, 19 IFF adopted the dissenters' position.
The IRS advocated Judge Tannewald's stance, and explicitly denied reliance upon Corn Products or section 1233. The Second
Circuit reversed and remanded on the issue of whether the transaction was a bona fide sale to the bank or was actually part of an
agency relationship.20 Thus, the Tax Court's majority decision,
based on Corn Products, was neither affirmed nor reversed.
Whether the Corn Products doctrine applied to forward
purchases of currency contracts, that is, whether such purchases
are integral parts of a business, remained unclear.
III.

RECENT DECISIONS

A.

Hoover Co.

In Hoover Co., 21 the Tax Court addressed the applicability of

the Corn Products doctrine to forward purchases of currency futures contracts. Hoover, attempting to offset its foreign subsidiaries' possible losses due to currency devaluations, engaged in eighteen forward purchases of currency futures contracts from 1968 to
1970. For tax purposes, Hoover treated its net gains and losses in
these transactions as ordinary income and loss. Hoover advanced
four arguments supporting its position. First, Hoover asserted
that the forward sale agreements were bona fide hedging transactions. Hoover expressly denied applicability of Corn Products or
the majority decisions in IFF as a basis for ruling in its favor.
Thus, the taxpayer put squarely before the court the question
whether gains and losses from hedging transactions that were not
an integral part of taxpayer's business could be characterized as
ordinary gain or loss. Second, Hoover argued that the losses resulted from a form of insurance which was deductible under sec17. Hall, Forrester and Sterrett, JJ., dissented.
18. 62 T.C. at 240 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).

19. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. Comm'r, 524 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. Id. at 360.
21.

Hoover Co., 72 TAx. CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 113 (1979).
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tion 162 as an ordinary and necessary business expense.22 Third,
Hoover contended that the currency that it had purchased to
meet its contract obligations" did not constitute a capital asset
and, therefore section 1233, governing short sales, did not apply.
Finally, Hoover posited that section 1233's closure requirement 24
was not met since the offsetting contracts entered into by Hoover
should be considered a release of Hoover's obligation to deliver on
the contracts. Before addressing these issues, the Tax Court
found it necessary to decide for itself whether the Corn Products
doctrine should apply. The Tax Court found that Hoover intended to protect the value of its stock ownership in foreign subsidiaries where the native currency was subject to devaluation
risk and to offset required financial reporting losses due to currency fluctuations when entering into these transactions. 25 The
court noted, however, that potential exchange losses of a subsidiary cannot reasonably be considered losses of the parent. The
court stated that "[t]he touchstone of the Corn Products doctrine
is that seemingly capital property transactions are entitled to ordinary treatment only when the transactions are an integral part
of the taxpayer's day-to-day business or are necessary to protect
or generate ordinary operating income. 2 6 Since these transactions were entered into to protect Hoover's stock investment in
its subsidiaries rather than as part of its day-to-day business operation, the Tax Court concluded that the Corn Products doctrine
was inapplicable. The court added that to the extent that InternationalFlavors & Fragranceswas inconsistent with this view, it
would no longer follow its previous decision. The court then considered Hoover's arguments. In rejecting the notion that these

22. Section 162(a) provides, "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. .. ." I.R.C. § 162(a).
23. In most of Hoover's transactions, rather than actually purchasing and

delivering the currency needed to fulfill its obligations, Hoover entered into separate contracts with the bank holding its currency futures contract, buying from

that bank the foreign currency necessary to cover its obligation. Thus, in reality,
the bank would merely offset the two contracts and, depending on whether a
gain or loss had been made by Hoover, would credit or debit Hoover's account in
the amount of the gain or loss. See Hoover Co., 72 TAx. CT. REP. DEC. (P-H)
113, 119-22 (1979) for details of each of the eighteen transactions.
24. I.R.C. § 1233(a). See note 14, supra.
25. 72 TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) at 128.

26. Id. at 129.

Fall 19801

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

transactions were legitimate hedges, the court set forth two tests
for determining a bona fide hedge. First, true hedges must be engaged in to maintain the balanced market position of the corporation rather than to enhance, through speculation, the corporation's position. The corporation must be hedging to protect its
market position, not, as the court found in the instant case, hedging to protect against a theorized loss in stock value. Second, a
bona fide hedge must always be viewed as protecting ordinary operating profits realized in the day-to-day operation of the business. Again, the instant court found that Hoover failed this test
as ordinary business operations were not involved. Joined with
this second test, the court observed, is the concept that hedges
must protect against a true and established risk of loss. In the
case at bar, the subsidiaries continued to operate with the same
assets and earning potential. Any risk was in the financial image
projected by the consolidated financial statements after the revaluation of assets caused by devaluation of the subsidiary's native
currency. The court found that this risk was not established in
Hoover, therefore, the hedging was not a legitimate form of deductible business insurance because this transaction was not a
bona fide hedge. In response to Hoover's third argument that
these currency futures contracts were not capital assets rendering
section 1233 inapplicable, the court determined that currency futures used to close a short sale were capital assets. The court then
noted that section 1233(a) did not indicate whether long- or
short-term treatment of the gain and loss is appropriate. Under
sections 1233(b) and (d), however, "substantially identical property" must be held or acquired by the taxpayer for a certain time
period before the short sale, or between the date of the short sale
and the closing, for the property to have capital asset status.27
When such property is acquired less than six months before the
date of the short sale, or between the date of the short sale and
the closing, any gain will be short-term capital gain. In all but one
of Hoover's transactions, the time between the purchase of the
currency and settlement date was less than one month. As a result, all but one of the transactions resulted in short-term capital
gain or loss.2 Finally, the court held that Hoover's short sales and
purchases did meet section 1233's closure requirements. Because

27. I.R.C. § 1233(b), (d). See note 14, supra.
28. 72 TAx CT. REP. DEc. (P-H) at 135-36. The one other contract was held
for more than six months, resulting in treatment as long-term capital gain.
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Hoover did not view the contracts as releases at the time it made
them, the court refused to allow Hoover to retroactively
recharacterize the nature of its transactions. Judge Tannenwald,
concurring in the court's opinion, stated that he did not feel the
majority opinion precluded the application of the Corn Products
doctrine because, in certain circumstances, treatment of such
transactions as ordinary gain and loss might be appropriate. One
dissenter felt Corn Products did apply
and that the transactions
29
resulted in ordinary income and loss.

B. American Home Products Corp. v. United States
American Home Products Corp. v. United States0 also involved a United States corporation concerned with the effects of
devaluation on its financial image. American Home entered into
four forward currency futures contracts with two United States
banks to cover the net exposure in American Home's British subsidiaries. American Home fulfilled two of the contracts and sold
the other two contracts to the Canadian Imperial Bank two weeks
before delivery of the pounds was due. Canadian Imperial paid
American Home $336,00031 for the contracts. American Home
characterized this as long-term capital gain. After an audit, the
IRS treated this sum as ordinary income for which American
Home was charged deficient. American Home paid the discrepancy and then sought a refund in the Court of Claims. The Court
of Claims agreed with American Home that its gain on the sale
was properly characterized as long-term capital gain. The court
rejected the IRS's contention that the assignments to Canadian
Imperial were not bona fide by noting that American Home had
clearly ceded all right, title, and interest in the contracts. The
Court of Claims also rejected the IRS's argument that the assignment to Canadian Imperial invoked the capital gains rule on
short sales in section 1233.2 The court held section 1233 inapplicable to this taxpayer because American Home, like Hoover,
never held "substantially identical property" at the time of the
29.

Id. at 137 (Chabot, J., dissenting).

30. 601 F.2d 540 (1979).
31. This amount equalled the difference between the contract exchange rate
of $2.80 per pound sterling and the prevailing exchange rate of $2.40 per pound,
minus a commission for Canadian Imperial.
32. I.R.C. § 1233(b). See note 14, supra.
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short sales or after.

3

IV.

ANALYSIS

Although the American Home Products and Hoover cases shed
some light on the proper characterization of gains and losses produced by forward currency futures contracts, a clear cut test to
determine the appropriate classification must still be enunciated
by the courts. The parameters of such a test, however, are outlined in these cases. The formula evolving appears to be a twopart analysis. First, the court will inquire whether the Corn Products doctrine is applicable. The applicability of Corn Products
will in turn hinge upon whether the transactions are found to be
integral parts of the corporation's everyday business or are considered necessary to protect everyday income. 4 If the transactions are integral parts of the business or protect everyday income, the Corn Products doctrine applies and the gains or losses
are considered ordinary. If, however, the transactions are not integral parts of the business or do not protect everyday income,
the court will apply the second part of the test to determine
whether the hedge is bona fide. A hedge is bona fide when the
taxpayer is attempting to maintain a balanced market position in
the particular commodity used in his trade or business and is attempting to protect ordinary operating profits. 5 If either of these
elements is lacking, the hedge is not legitimate. The ramifications
of finding a hedge to be legitimate or illegitimate are manifold. If
it is a true hedge, the gain and loss it produces will not be considered a capital gain or loss from short sales under section 1233.36 If
it is not a true hedge, the gains and losses may, as in Hoover and
InternationalFlavors & Fragrances,fall within section 1233 and
be characterized as long or short-term capital gain or loss. Up to
this point, the treatment is no different from that accorded taxpayers prior to the Hoover and American Home cases. The Hoover court expressed the new development when it stated that, "in
situations which do not constitute a true hedge, ordinary treatment of gains and losses on certain property transactions will be
appropriate if a sufficient and direct relationship to the tax33.
34.
35.
36.

601 F.2d at 549.
Hoover Co., 72 TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 113, 129 (1979).
Id. at 129-30.
I.R.C. § 1233(g). See note 14, supra.
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payer's ordinary and operating aspects of its business is shown. 81 7
Thus, in certain circumstances in which hedging takes place but
is of a character that places it outside of the Corn Products concept of "integral part of the business," if the hedging is still
closely related to the business' everyday operation and profit, the
gains and losses will be treated as ordinary.3 s This new doctrine
makes it easier for a corporation to hedge and have the gain or
loss treated as ordinary. For the corporation that would benefit
from capital treatment of hedging gains and losses, however, this
stance is hazardous because it widens the scope of ordinary tax
treatment and narrows the applicability of section 1233.
V.

CONCLUSION

The proper characterization of gains and losses produced by
currency futures hedging remains murky. But the Hoover and
American Home cases indicate that if a transaction does not fall
squarely within the Corn Products doctrine as an integral part of
the business operation, ordinary gain or loss treatment is not
foreclosed. It is significant that the Hoover court was compelled
to establish this new category, even though it held that Hoover
Co. did not fit within it.3 9 It would have been more helpful if the
Tax Court had created the category and provided an example of a
corporation which properly fits within it. Although this broadening of the ordinary treatment category may be a benefit to some
multinational corporations, for others it may be a pitfall.in their
attempt to minimize the adverse effects of currency devaluations
on their financial statements.
Benjamin W. Pardue

37. 72 TAX CT. REP. DEC. at 127.
38. Id.
39. It is also unusual that the Court of Claims, which decided the American
Home case in June of 1979, made no reference to the Hoover opinion, decided in
April of that year. Perhaps the case simply was not brought to the Court's
attention.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY -

JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
I.

INTRODUCTION

United States antitrust laws were designed to promote economic prosperity and allocative efficiency at a time when the
United States was not heavily involved in the world economic
market.1 The recent increase in trade between the United States,
with its strong free enterprise doctrines and laws, and foreign nations, with contrary or even conflicting economic views, has
caused disputes that drafters of the antitrust statutes did not envision. These disputes raise the question of when, if ever, the
United States antitrust laws should apply to foreign business.
The question involves not only the jurisdictional scope of the antitrust laws but also doctrines of public international law, such as
the doctrine of sovereign immunity,2 which concerns the amenability of foreign parties to suit in United States courts. Two recent United States District Court cases, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries,3 and OutboardMarine Corporation v. Pezetel4 illuminate these issues. This paper will examine
how the courts handled jurisdictional issues in these cases and
whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 5 forces courts to
make foreign policy decisions outside the scope of their constitutional role.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In each of the instant cases, defendants raised the issue of sovereign immunity as a defense. Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of
public international law under which domestic courts refrain from
1.

K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusIHEss ABROAD 3 (1976); L.

SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 14 (1977).

2. See generally W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 531 (1971).
3. No. 78-5012-AAH(SX) (C.D. Cal., filed Sept. 18, 1979) [hereinafter cited
as IAM v. OPEC].
4. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
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asserting jurisdiction over a foreign state6 to avoid possible interference with the internal management of the foreign country. In
The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,7 the United States Supreme Court held that a foreign state was absolutely immune

from suit unless it consented. This opinion typified the theory of
absolute immunity that predominated in early judicial discussions

and decisions. The theory of absolute immunity was generally accepted until the early 1900's when the restrictive theory of immunity developed in the European nations. The restrictive theory
distinguished between commercial (jure gestionis) and governmental (jure imperii) activities. Although a state's governmental
activities were immune under the restrictive theory, the commercial activities of the state were not. At the Brussels Convention of
April 10, 1926, thirteen nations signed an agreement that formally
recognized the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.8 The
United States, however, did not sign the Brussels Convention
document. At that time, United States courts relied heavily on
suggestions made by the State Department in deciding whether
or not to grant immunity. Although this was not a formal adoption of the restrictive theory, cases such as Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman9 suggested that United States policy was shifting away

6. BIsHoP, supra note 2, at 531.
7. 11 U.S. (7Cranch) 116 (1812).
8. See 176 L.N.T.S. 199; G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 463 (1941).
9. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). The Hoffman Court considered whether, without a
policy statement by the Executive branch of government, a court should recognize jurisdictional immunity for a merchant vessel that is owned, though not
possessed, by a friendly foreign government. Id. at 31. The plaintiff in Hoffman
filed an in rem action for damages resulting from a collision at sea. The Mexican
ambassador initially suggested that the ship was owned and possessed by the
Republic of Mexico and was engaged in transporting cargo from Mexican ports.
Id. The United States requested advice from the State Department which simply cited Ervin v. Quintanilla,99 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1938) and Compania Espanola v. The Navemare, 303 U.S. 68 (1937). In Ervin jurisdictional immunity was
recognized because the ship involved was in the possession and service of the
Mexican government. In Espanola, however, jurisdictional immunity was rejected because the ship involved was not in the possession and service of the
Spanish government when it was seized. The district court in Hoffman denied
immunity because the ship was in the possession, operation, and control of a
private Mexican corporation. The district court rejected the State Department's
implied argument for immunity because the ship was property of the Mexican
government and the Mexican government accepted liability for the ship. 324
U.S. at 32. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had affirmed, rejecting
the Petitioner's argument that the court should recognize the title of the Mexi-
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from absolute immunity. The restrictive theory became official
United States policy with the publication of the "Tate Letter" on
May 19, 1952.10 Henceforth, United States courts deferred com-

pletely to State Department suggestions concerning the granting
of immunity. If a foreign defendant wished to invoke the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, it first had to petition the State Department for a ruling which, if granted, was then followed by United
States courts. If the defendant failed to petition the State Department but later wished to raise the issue of sovereign immunity the court would make its own determination of the defendant's status. 1 Thus, the law concerning the application of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was jointly articulated by the judiciary and the State Department. 2 In 1976, however, Congress
enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)'3 which
codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The bill had
four goals: (1) to transfer the task of determining whether a foreign state is entitled to immunity to the courts; (2) to particularize the restrictive theory in statutory form; (3) to make foreign
states more susceptable to execution on judgments rendered
against them, thus making them conform more closely to the restrictive theory; and (4) to specify the means by which process
may be served on a foreign state." The new bill assured litigants
that the crucial decisions of immunity were made on purely legal
can government as grounds for immunity. Id. at 34. The court decided that in
the absence of a recognized claim of jurisdictional immunity by the Executive
branch of government a court may decide whether the requisites of immunity
exist. Id. at 35. This was precisely the practice adopted by the courts when the
restrictive theory of immunity was later adopted and the State Department offered no advice in a particular case. See note 10, infra. The Hoffman Court concluded that the test for determining whether a court should exercize jurisdiciton
is whether the court's exercise of jurisdiction would embarrass the Executive
branch in its conduct of foreign affairs. 324 U.S. at 39. Thus the trend toward a
restrictive policy was evident in the behavior of both the Hoffman Court and the
State Department.
10. 26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 984 (1952).
11. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Speaker of the House accompanying the draft bill of the FSIA (Jan. 16, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Letter to
the Speaker]. In Hoffman, the State Department failed to render an opinion on
an immunity request.
'12. Letter to the Speaker, supra note 11.
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
14. Letter to the Speaker, supra note 11, at 2.
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grounds and under procedures insuring due process. 15 Congress
intended the FSIA to affect the level of judicial deference shown
the State Department regarding sovereign immunity.18 Following
the enactment of the FSIA, the State Department could no longer
dictate the outcome of sovereign immunity decisions. Congress
had specifically legislated away any executive power in the deter-

mination of sovereign immunity status. This legislative act, in
1
conjunction with Justice Jackson's analysis in the Steel Seizure 7
case, prohibited the executive branch from making any immunity
decision in politically sensitive cases."8 Thus, the FSIA disallowed
the courts from deferring to the executive and forced them to
bear the burden for ramifications resulting from immunity
decisions.

Congress intended the FSIA to expedite and depoliticize litigation against foreign states and to minimize conflicts with foreign
relations from such litigation. 19 Congress also expected the courts
to apply the restrictive theory of immunity. One criticism of the
pre-statute system was that the State Department made purely
political determinations in the decisions to grant immunity without giving serious consideration to the distinction between com-

15. Id.
16.

H. MAIER, THE PROPOSED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: ITS EFFECT ON JU-

DICIAL DEFERENCE, in Proceedings of the American Society of InternationalLaw
48 (April, 1976).
17. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring). Justice Jackson established three categories of Executive power
based on the level of Congressional involvement. He then examined the nature
of judicial deference that corresponded with each category of Executive power.
The three categories of Executive power were: 1) When the Executive acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress; 2) When the Executive
acts in absence of either a Congressional grant or denial of authority; and 3)
When the Executive takes measures incompatible with the express or implied
will of Congress. Id. at 635-37. In category number one, the judiciary must defer
totally to the Executive. Category two, Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight," is an
area of concurrent authority in which deference between branches of the government is optional and flexible. In category three, the Executive is at its lowest
ebb of power, and courts cannot sustain Executive action without disabling Congress from acting upon the same subject. Id. at 637. Prior to the FSIA, category
two arguably existed, and the judiciary and Executive worked together in solving difficult immunity problems. Because the FSIA is clearly within category
three, the Executive is wholly without power to dictate policy and immunity
decisions to the courts.
18. MAIER, supra note 16.

19. Id. at 50.
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mercial and governmental activity. 20 Under the FSIA, however,

courts must decide whether the activity involved is commercial or
governmental in making sovereign immunity decisions. The question that remains is whether the judiciary is the proper branch of
government to make such important decisions in United States
foreign relations.
III. THE INSTANT CASES
A. InternationalAssociation of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers v. Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries, et
al.
Plaintiff union 21 filed suit against the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 22 and its individual member
countries in December 1978, in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. Plaintiff alleged that24the
2s
defendant's price setting activities were a per se violation of
25
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff's alleged injury con-

20. Id.
21. The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM) filed this suit from their Los Angeles headquarters.
22. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries consists of thirteen
member nations: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Qator, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
23. The principal aim of OPEC was stated in its charter as "the unification
of petroleum policies for the Member Countries and the determination of the
best means for safeguarding the interests of the Member Countries individually
and collectively." Resolution of the First Conference Resolution 1.2(4) as reported in IAM v. OPEC, at 3. The organization expressly wished to stabilize
prices by regulating production to secure steady income to the producing nations. The system implemented by OPEC included establishing prices for crude

oil. Id.
24. Determining a per se violation requires application of a two part test: 1)
whether the practice is likely to cause substantial injury to completion; and 2)
whether an inquiry into the alleged practice will be complex, time-consuming, or
result in uncertainty. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrTRusT 193
(1977). The typical price-fixing agreement among competitors has come to be
described as unlawful per se. Thus, no proof is required in the particular case
for the collaborators' power, their purpose, or the effects. AREEDA & TURNER,
ANTrrRUST LAW 47 (1978). See also United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S.

127 (1966); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1957); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trusts or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal."
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sisted of higher consumer gasoline prices due to the anti-competitive activity of the OPEC countries. Plaintiff sought damages
under Section 4 of the Claytbn Act" and injunctive relief under
Section 16 of the Clayton Act.2" Jurisdiction was based upon the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act2 8 as well as the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.2 The court consolidated the evidentiary hearings
for plaintiff's preliminary injunction and default judgment with
the trial on the final injunction.3 0 The court also issued an Order
to Show Cause asking for factual and legal assistance on eighteen
questions from the defendants and any other sources as amici curiae.3 1 The thirteen member nations of OPEC were properly
served but chose not to appear. The court entered a default, with
judgment reserved until the hearings were complete. The court
then considered whether OPEC could be properly served under

26. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), which provides: "Any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue in any district court of the United States in which the defendant resides, or is found or has an agent. ..

."

27. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), which provides: "Any person ... shall be entitled
to sue for and have injunctive relief in any court of the United States having
jurisdiction over the parties against threatened loss or damaged by a violation of
the antitrust laws. ..

."

28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
29. See notes 26 and 27, supra.
30. Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction on June 25, 1979. Defendants failed to appear. The court, following the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1608
(e), which provides that "[no judgment by default shall be entered by the court
' . unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to injunction relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court," found that the defendant should have a full
opportunity to be heard prior to any ruling on the motion for injunction. !AM v.
OPEC,at 5. The court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction consolidated with the trial on the final injunction under Rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The evidentiary hearing on motions for
default judgment was also set for the same day, August 20, 1979.
31. IAM v. OPEC, at 5. Judge Hauk filed the Order to Show Cause on June
25, 1979. The orders were sent out requesting assistance from plaintiffs, defendants, the State Department, the Justice Department, and the Department of
Energy. Copies were also sent to all state attorneys general. The unique order
included questions regarding the viability of the suit's subject matter jurisdiction, in pensonam jurisdiction, plaintiff's standing to sue, and entry of a default
judgment. The order also sought advice on whether attachment or execution
would be possible and on the propriety of a preliminary injunction in the case.
Eleven briefs were submitted in response. The State Department did not file a
brief. In addition, seventeen state attorneys general filed a joint memorandum of
law urging that the suit not be dismissed.
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either the FSIA or the International Organizations Immunities
Act 3 2 (IOIA). The court held that the FSIA applied only to foreign sovereigns, and that OPEC could not be considered a foreign
sovereign."3 The court also held that the IOIA applied only to international organizations "in which the United States participates,"3 4 and, since the United States was not an OPEC member,
the IOIA was inapplicable to OPEC. 5 Therefore, the court dismissed OPEC from the suit because it could not be legally
served.36
After dismissing plaintiff's damages claim and determining
that, even though plaintiff was an indirect purchaser,37 it could
32. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976).
33. IAM v. OPEC, at 6.
34. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976) as reported by the Court. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The court dismissed the damages portion of the plaintiff's claim because
after Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), a plaintiff in a price fixing
case may recover only if it made purchases directly from the price fixer. Since
the plaintiff did not allege or show that it purchased any crude oil or gasoline or
had any direct dealings with the defendants, it was an "indirect purchaser." An
"indirect purchaser" is one who is once or twice removed from the alleged violator. Illinois Brick effectively precludes any "indirect purchasers" from obtaining
damages by denying the offensive or defensive use of the "pass-on" or "passthrough" doctrine by which an indirect purchaser can achieve the causal nexus
necessary for a damages claim. Id. at 730. Plaintiff argued that it qualified under
certain exceptions recognized in Illinois Brick where the pass-through doctrine
would make an indirect purchaser a plaintiff who could recover damages. The
Illinois Brick Court stated that a pre-existing cost-plus contract would be one
instance where the pass-through doctrine would be allowed. Id. at 736. The
Court also pointed out that the pass-through doctrine would be allowed where a
direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customers. Id. at 736, n. 16. Plaintiffs argued that the exception applied in the instant case because: (1) certain
federal pass-through regulations are analogous to a cost-plus contract; (2) domestic oil companies conspired with the defendants; and (3) defendants controlled the United States oil companies from whom the plaintiff purchases gasoline. IAM v. OPEC, at 11. See 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(2) (1976); 10 C.F.R. 212.83
(1978).
The instant court rejected plaintiff's first theory because the federal passthrough regulations did not have the necessary features of a cost-plus contract
stated in Illinois Brick, namely- (1) a direct and easily measurable pass-on of
costs and (2) a commitment for a fixed quantity. 431 U.S. at 730. The federal
pass-through regulations allow for a dollar-for-dollar pass-through of net increases in the cost of crude oil faced by domestic companies. In practice, however, the oil companies do not directly and immediately pass-on any price increases in crude, but instead wait until market conditions are conducive to an
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seek injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act,8s the
court faced the jurisdiction issue. The court had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) which
grants jurisdiction to district courts in actions against foreign
states.3 The statute provides, however, that jurisdiction exists
only when the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.40 As a
result, the court had to examine facts of this case under the
FSIA to determine whether it had jurisdiction. Under the FSIA,
the United States grants immunity to foreign states, subject to
certain exceptions.41 Plaintiff relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
which states that foreign sovereigns are not immune in any case:
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
increase in gasoline prices. The instant court held that this practice was not a
direct and easily measurable pass-through. The court also pointed out that because consumers are not required to buy fixed amounts of gasoline, plaintiff's
first theory as an exception under Illinois Brick was completely disqualified.
Plaintiff's theories concerning conspiracy with and control by the OPEC countries of the domestic oil producers were dismissed as vague and without factual
support. IMA v. OPEC, at 13.
38. The courts faced the open question whether an indirect purchaser could
seek injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976),
supra note 27. In Mid-West Paper Products v. Continental Group, Inc., 596
F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979) the Third Circuit held that Illinois Brick did not preclude an indirect purchaser from seeking injunctive relief. The Mid-West court
distinguished Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides for damages for actual injury, from Section 16 of the Act, which allows for injunctive relief against
threatened loss. The court noted that under Section 16 the plaintiff need "only
demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending [violation] of the
antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation likely to continue or occur." Id.
at 591. The Mid-West court held that the test for standing under Section 16
would be a proximate cause standard, less vigorous than a Section 4 damages
standard that requires direct injury. Id. at 591-92. It was also noted that as indirect purchasers, the plaintiffs that had obviously been damaged would be foreclosed from relief unless they could seek an injunction under Section 16. Id. at
593. The instant court felt that although certain evidentiary problems might exist in a suit for injunctive relief, Congress had not intended to exclude such a
large class of potential plaintiffs from protection of the antitrust laws. The instant court followed the Mid-West ruling and allowed the plaintiff to sue for
injunctive relief.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) provides: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy in any non-jury civil
action against a foreign state ...

immunity...
40. Id.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).

to which a state is not entitled to
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in the United States by the foreign state, or upon an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere, or upon an act outside the territory of

the United States in connection with commercial activity of the
and the act causes a direct effect in the
foreign state elsewhere
42
United States.

The crucial issue before the court was whether the defendant's
activities were "commercial activities" under § 1605(a)(2). Rather
than price-fixing, the court characterized defendant's pricing
mechanism as the "ability and willingness to control the production of crude oil."' 43 Thus, the instant court concluded that the
"essence of [the OPEC] monopoly" was the control of supply or
output restriction. 4 ' The court then examined the FSIA definition
of "commercial activity," which provides that:
A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The

commercial character of an activity shall be determined by the naact,
ture of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
5
rather than by reference to its purpose. (Emphasis added).4

Citing the legislative history of the FSIA, the court determined
that the activity is non-commercial if it is one in which only a
sovereign may engage. 46 The court narrowly defined the act involved in order to follow the legislative intent of the FSIA, that
47
is, to keep the courts away from areas sensitive to foreign policy.
With this narrow interpretation, the court determined that the
act in controversy was the setting, by a sovereign state, of the
terms and conditions for the removal of a prime natural resource,
crude oil. The court then decided that this regulation of crude oil
was a sovereign, not a commercial, act. Emphasizing that the
United Nations had repeatedly recognized under international
law the right of a sovereign state to exercise sole control over its
natural resources,' 8 the instant court reasoned that this activity
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
43. 1AM v. OPEC, at 21.
44. Id.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
46. IAM v. OPEC, at 21. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1976) [hereinafter House Report].
47. IAM v. OPEC, at 21.
48. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1803, § 1(1), 17(2) U.N. GAOR, 327, U.N. Doc. A/C 2/
5 R 850 (1962):
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was inextricably bound to sovereignty, and that the defendant's
control over its oil was therefore an essential element of its sovereignty.4 9 Accordingly, the court concluded that the regulation of
the extraction of oil was a sovereign act and rejected plaintiff's
allegation that a conspiracy among nations to fix oil prices was a
commercial act. The court reasoned that since each nation was
regulating the extraction of natural resources, a sovereign act, an
agreement among nations to regulate the performance of that activity was also a sovereign act.5 0

Bearing in mind its resolution 1515(xv) of 15 December 1960, in which it
recommended that the sovereign right of every state to dispose of its
wealth and its natural resources should be respected.
Consideringthat any measure in this respect must be based on the recognition of the unavailable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interest, and in
respect for the economic independence of States, .
Declares, that;
1. The right of people and nations to permanent sovereignty over
their national wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest
of their national development and of the well-being of the people of
the State concerned.
Accord, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, Ch. H.
Art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281 (XXIX)(1974); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in 1974; G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), §
4(e), U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559; Res. 3171,
G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR 30 (vol. 1) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Res.
3016, G.A. Res. 3016, Preamble and § 1, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), U.N.
Doc. A/8730; Res. 2158, G.A. Res. 2158, § 1(1), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
29, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
49. The instant court also noted that there is United States case law and
statutory law that allows states to control and market their own resources. See,
e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); United States v. Brumfield, 85 F.
Supp. 696 (W.D. La. 1949). The Federal Connally Hot Oil Act, 15 U.S.C. § 715
(1976).
50. IAM v. OPEC, at 26. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that
the United States implicitly recognized the activities of OPEC member nations
as sovereign activities in connection with the production and sale of oil when the
United States entered into "consent decrees" with the seven largest domestic oil
producers. These "consent decrees" granted specific "exceptions" and "permissive provisions" that allow the oil companies to engage in price fixing and production control when the law of foreign nations required them to do so. Id. The
court made reference to the consent decrees set forth in Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division Case No. 1163 on Nov. 14, 1960. The decrees were recognized
in United States v. StandardOil Co. (New Jersey), [1960] TRADE CASES (CCH)
%69,849, 77,735 (Nov. 14, 1960), and United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., [1960]
TRADE CASES (CCH)
69,851, 77,344, (Nov. 14, 1960).
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Even though the instant court disposed of the case for lack of
jurisdiction, it reached certain other conclusions.51 Addressing the
jurisdictional question with regard to the antitrust statutes, the
instant court determined that plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief in the instant case only if defendants were "persons" as defined in the Sherman Act.52 Section 8 of the Sherman Act 53 and
Section 1 of the Clayton Act" define "person" or "persons" to
include "corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of the territories, the laws of any state, or the
laws of a foreign country."55 Since the statute does not state
whether a foreign sovereign is a person, the instant court turned
to case law for its definition. Citing Parker v. Brown,5" in which
the Supreme Court held that a domestic state is not a person who
may be sued under the antitrust laws, the instant court ruled that
the same considerations that apply to domestic states apply with
equal force to sovereigns. The court found support for this extension of the Parker rationale in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.57 in which
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also held that foreign sovereigns are not "persons" subject to Sherman Act liability. The
Court further noted that the United States District Court for the
State of Delaware had reached the same result in International
Refining Corporationv. Texaco Maracaibo,Inc.5 8
51. It can be argued that these other considerations and conclusions are
merely dicta. If they are not dicta, however, they may be read as alternative
holdings.

52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
53. Id. § 7.

54. Id. § 12.
55. See notes 53 and 54, supra.
56. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
57. 550 F.2d 68, 78 n. 14 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
Even though the government of Libya was not a defendant in this case, the
Second Circuit considered its possible liability and concluded that it could not
be subject to Sherman Act liability because it was not a person under the terms
of the statute.
58. 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970). The InternationalRefining court
held that: "The Sherman Act refers only to persons, not to states or nations, and
both the Act and the Constitution would be badly misinterpreted to permit liability for acts of a sovereign." Id. Plaintiff in the instant action argued, however,
that the FSIA changed the law regarding jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in
antitrust actions. The plaintiff suggested that language in the legislative history
indicated that terms in Section 1603(e) of the FSIA were not intended to alter
the application of the Sherman Act to any defendant and thus the bill did not
affect the holdings in several cases. House Report, supra note 46, at 19.
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The instant court's reliance on International Refining and
Hunt is significant in light of a recent Supreme Court case, Pfizer
Inc. v. India.59 The Pfizer Court held that a foreign sovereign
may be a "person" under the antitrust laws in order to act as a
plaintiff bringing suit. The Pfizer Court permitted the foreign
sovereign to be a plaintiff "person" because in doing so the judiciary was not required to interfere in sensitive matters of foreign
policy.60 Plaintiff in the instant case, however, argued that since a
foreign sovereign could file suit under the Sherman Act it should
also be amenable to suit as a defendant. The instant court did not
extend the Pfizer ruling to include foreign sovereigns as potential
defendants for two reasons. First, the court found no Congressional intent to extend Sherman Act liability to foreign sovereigns
in this situation. Second, the court noted that the accepted judicial policy has been to exercise restraint whenever areas of foreign
policy are involved. 1 For these reasons the court concluded that
it lacked jurisdiction over the defendants under the FSIA and the
antitrust statutes.2 '
B. Outboard Marine Corporation v. Pezetel, et al.
Plaintiff Outboard Marine Corporation 3 (OMC) fied suit in
the United States District Court in Delaware alleging antitrust
Neither the term "direct effect" nor the concept of "substantial contacts"
embodied in Section 1603(e) is intended to alter the application of the
Sherman Act... to any defendant. Thus, this bill does not affect the
holdings in such cases as United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nay. Co.,
228 U.S. 87 (1913), or Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.,
404 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
Id. The court pointed out, however, that the language relied on by the plaintiff
did not refer to any cases where there was an attempt to assert jurisdiction over
a foreign sovereign. These cases involved the extraterritorial reach of domestic
antitrust laws, but did not involve a foreign sovereign as a party to suit. Thus
the plaintiff's argument seems to be misguided, a conclusion shared by the instant court. IAM v. OPEC, at 30.
59. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
60. Id. at 319.
61. IAM v. OPEC, at 32. (citing 434 U.S. 308, 330 (1978)).
62. Upon completion of the hearing, the court did not issue a default judgment against the OPEC nations. Since there was no default judgment, there
could be no waiver of immunity. The court found alternatively that the plaintiffs failed on the merits as well.
63. Outboard Marine Corporation, a diversified Delaware corporation, a division of which, Cushman, formerly manufactured electric golf carts.
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violations against defendants Pezetel,0 and several of its United
States importers and distributers.65 The suit arose because an
OMC subsidiary, Cushman, left the electric golf cart industry because it could not compete with the prices offered by Pezetel. 6
Pezetel answered plaintiff's four count complaint contesting the
court's jurisdiction as well as the substantive antitrust claims."7
Defendant Pezetel contested the court's jurisdiction on the
grounds that it was immune from jurisdiction under the FSIA,
that it was not a person under the antitrust laws, and that the act
of state doctrine precluded any jurisdiction by the court. Pezetel
advanced four basic arguments in favor of its claim for immunity
under the FSIA. First, Pezetel maintained that the FSIA was not
intended to reach the antitrust claims presented in the instant
64. Pezetel, a Foreign Trade Enterprise of the Aviation Industry of Poland,
is an agency or instrumentality created by and responsible to the People's Republic of Poland.
65. Defendant Melex USA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Pezetel, imports
Pezetel golf carts and sells them in geographic areas where there are no Melex
dealers. Defendant Ross Products, Inc., a Delaware corporation, distributes
Melex golf carts in certain southern and southwestern states. Defendant Fern

Clo Car, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, distributes Melex golf carts in Delaware, New Jersey, New York, New England, and parts of Pennsylvania. Defen-

dant Eddietron Inc., a North Carolina corporation, distributes Melex golf carts
in North and South Carolina, Virginia, parts of Tennessee, West Virginia, and
Maryland. Defendant Boyland Leasing Company, a Michigan corporation, distributes Melex golf carts in certain midwestern states.
66. The electric golf cart industry has historically been very competitive. Until 1970, domestic manufacturers dominated the market. In 1970, a United
States corporation, Products International, entered into an agreement with
Elektrim Foreign Trade Company of Poland (Pezetel's predecessor) to manufacture an electric golf cart to its specification. Eight carts were imported in 1970.
This increased to 6087 carts in 1973 and 8040 carts in 1974. Pezetel succeeded
Electrim and established Melex as its importer and set up an extensive distribution network. By 1975, Pezetel had captured 35% of the domestic golf cart market. Pezetel's phenomenal success was linked to its position as the price leader
in the market. Pezetel could offer low prices as a result of a cost subsidy provided by the Polish government. OMC's Cushman division was forced out of the
market in 1975 because of antitrust violations on the part of Pezetel. 461 F.
Supp. at 398.
67. Plaintiff cited the following violations in its complaint: (1) restraint of
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); (2)
illegal monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); (3)
violation of Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976); and (4)
violations of the Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
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case. Pezetel argued that under Section 1606 of the FSIA65 a foreign state could not be liable for punitive damages. Since plaintiff
was seeking punitive treble damages under the antitrust laws,
these damages were not allowed under the FSIA. The court rejected this contention, noting that Pezetel had failed to include
the language "except for an agency or instrumentality," in its
reading of Section 1606 of the FSIA.6 9 The court found that, as an
agency or instrumentality of the Polish government, Pezetel was
subject to the punitive damages sought by the plaintiff. Pezetel's
second effort to succeed under the FSIA involved an attempt to
70
limit the "commercial activity" language of Section 1605(a)(2)
to legal disputes based exclusively on tort and breach of contract
claims. To support its position, Pezetel noted that the legislative
history cited these types of cases as illustrations. 1 The court rejected this argument on three grounds: first, the plain meaning of
the language of the statute had no qualifying language that would
limit its applicability; second, the legislative history stated that
the courts would have a great deal of latitude in determining
what is a "commercial activity" for the purposes of the bill.72 Finally, the legislative history expressly recognized the Sherman
Act and its relation to the FSIA.73 The Court also rejected
Pezetel's third contention that, under the FSIA, antitrust laws
could not apply to foreign sovereigns because it would involve an
inquiry into the inner motives of governmental policy. The court
stated that determining whether an activity is a "commercial activity" simply required consideration of the nature of the act and
not its purpose. 4 Since the manufacture and sale of electric golf
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976) provides:
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign
state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstance; but a foreign state except for an
agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages.... (emphasis added).
69. 461 F. Supp. 384, 495 (D. Del. 1978).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
House Report, supra note 46, at 7.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
461 F. Supp. at 395. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1926), which provides:

"The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than
by reference to its purpose."
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carts was clearly a commercial act, the court concluded that the
FSIA applied. In its fourth and final argument, Pezetel tried to
escape FSIA jurisdiction through a technical point. Pezetel argued that actions brought under the FSIA must be non-jury civil
actions.75 Since plaintiff was seeking jury trial against all of the
other defendants except Pezetel, Pezetel maintained that the action could no longer be considered non-jury. The court rejected
this argument as being an overly technical reading of the statute.
The court also noted that the sovereign's right may be protected
by parallel jury and non-jury trials.7
Pezetel then raised the issue of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns under the antitrust laws, by claiming to be the equivalent of
the Polish government. The court, however, declined to equate
Pezetel with the government7 and, as a result, rejected any arguments based on the Pfizer case.7 8 The court also examined and
rejected Pezetel's argument that case law grants immunity from
the antitrust laws to entities acting under the authority of a sovereign state. 79 Finally, the court denied Pezetel's last general jurisdictional argument based on the act of state doctrine.8s Thus,
75. 461 F. Supp. at 396. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976); supra note 39.
76. 461 F. Supp. at 396.
77.

Id.

78. Id.; see also Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), where the Supreme
Court permitted a foreign sovereign to file suit under the antitrust laws.
79. Pezetel argued that the Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), exemption
for state action would be controlling in this case, thus granting immunity from
suit. 461 F. Supp. at 397. The instant court made two points regarding this contention: (1) Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), limits the
Parker state action exemption to conduct that is compelled and not merely promoted or allowed by the state, so that if Pezetel could prove that it was involved
in state action (i.e. that it was acting for or in behalf of the government of Poland in selling golf carts in the United States) it must show that it was compelled to manufacture and sell golf carts in the manner it did; and (2) Pezetel's
claim for immunity due to state action is not supported by the antitrust laws
because they expressly cover corporations organized under foreign laws. Id. See
also, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
80. The act of state doctrine precludes United States courts from inquiring
into the validity of public acts of recognized foreign powers committed within
their own territory. This doctrine is discussed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Under the Sabbatino rule, a litigant must fulfill
three requirements in order to invoke the act of state doctrine: (1) a public act
must be involved; (2) it must have been committed by a recognized foreign
power; and (3) the act must be exclusively within the territory of the foreign
power. The instant court noted that Pezetel failed to establish any of these cri-
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the instant court found that it had proper jurisdiction over
Pezetel. Having ruled on the jurisdictional portion of the motion
.to dismiss, the court then turned to the four substantive antitrust
8s
claims raised by the plaintiff
teria. In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals expanded the act of state doctrine to include a situation in
which nationalization of the plaintiff's property was involved and the foreign
power was not a defendant. The Hunt court reasoned that the suit would involve judicial inquiry into the acts and conduct of Libyan officials in conducting
foreign policy. Id. at 72. The instant court, however, found no similarity between
the Hunt case and Pezetel's situation, because in Hunt the sovereign was not an
entrepreneur. Id. at 73. Pezetel did not rely on Hunt as authority to apply the
act of state doctrine to a private defendant, but instead contended that Pezetel
itself should be treated as the Polish government. This argument was again dismissed by the court. The court did not have to decide if this was a situation
where the commercial activity of a foreign sovereign fell outside the act of state
doctrine because Pezetel was not a foreign sovereign. 461 F. Supp. at 398.
81. Plaintiff had alleged that defendant's reduced prices and restricted distribution scheme violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
The court dismissed the Section 1 claim for two reasons: (1) the pricing scheme
argument failed to state a claim; and (2) although the alleged horizontal restraints would suffice as a claim, plaintiff could show no injury resulting from
the practice. Plaintiff's second claim alleged that defendant's pricing scheme
and restricted distribution network violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1976), which makes illegal any attempts to monopolize the market
where there is a probability of success. The court concluded that defendant's
pricing activities were insufficient to imply the requisite intent for a Section 2
claim. 461 F. Supp. at 405. The court did find, however, that defendant's territorial restraints could possibly reflect the intent to eliminate competition by attempting to monopolize the market. Id. Thus, the Section 2 claim withstood the
motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's third claim involved alleged violations of Section
73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8 (1976), which generally extends the
Sherman Act to cover the importation of goods from foreign countries. The
court concluded that the Wilson Act made it clear that antitrust laws applied to
import trade and that the Act embraced both Section 1 and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. 461 F. Supp. at 407. The court pointed out that plaintiff would
have the same problems proving specific intent under the Wilson Act as it would
encounter in the claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but that the cause
of action should survive the defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's last claim
involved alleged violations under the Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72
(1976), which prohibits price discrimination between purchasers in different na-

tional markets. See J. Viner,
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(1966). The court rejected this claim because the defendant was selling golf carts
in only one country and therefore could not discriminate by price. 461 F. Supp.
at 409.
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IV.

A.

ANALYSIS

The FSIA Issue

The two instant cases provide examples of the jurisdictional
problems which occur when the United States attempts to apply
its antitrust laws to foreign nations. The OPEC court realized
that it did not have enough information or expertise to render a
complete and proper analysis of the foreign policy implications of
its immunity decisions without additional aid. 2 Thus, the OPEC
court issued an Order to Show Cause" to the defendants and
other key parties, including the State Department. The State Department failed to reply to the order. Even though under the
FSIA this opinion should be accorded the same weight as any
other amicus brief, it is arguable that if the State Department
had filed a brief suggesting that immunity could be consistent
with existing foreign policy, the instant court would have construed OPEC's allegedly illegal activity as price fixing rather than
the "establishment . . .of the terms and conditions for the re-

moval of a prime natural resource. "84 As no brief was fied, however, under the FSIA, the instant court was forced to make its
own foreign policy appraisal and, as a result, narrowly construed
the activity involved as non-commercial. A truly depoliticized determination would not have required such a narrow reading of the
statute's language. The instant cases indicate that the courts are
in a very precarious position when they interpret the FSIA.
Forced to take notice of political realities, the courts cannot make
depoliticized jurisdictional rulings. Instead, in volatile litigation
involving scarce resources, as in OPEC, the courts are forced to
construe the statute's language very narrowly in order to avoid
creating difficult foreign policy problems. By contrast, in less politically sensitive cases, like Pezetel, the courts have greater freedom to make an objective reading of the statute. In the effort to
depoliticize the immunity decisions, Congress ignored the practical realities involved. Sovereign immunity decisions cannot be
made without political ramifications that necessarily affect foreign relations. Although the drafters of the Constitution did not
82. This is indicated by the court's issuance of the Order to Show Cause,

seeking advice on the sensitive issues of the case. See note 19 supra; IAM v.
OPEC, at 5.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 21.
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intend foreign policy decisions to be made through interpretation
of jurisdictional language by the courts85 this result is inevitable
under the FSIA. Future courts will most likely follow the trend in
the instant cases and construe the FSIA language narrowly to facilitate smooth foreign relations when politically sensitive issues
are involved. But this will not resolve the problems with the statute. Consider the application of the FSIA to politically sensitive
disputes with Third World nations. Courts are expected to make
jurisdictional decisions based on a differentiation between commercial and governmental acts. In the case of Third World nations, however, there is no such distinction. No economic decision
based on the allocation of scarce resources can be severed from
governmental and political activity. In developing nations, the existence of healthy government is directly linked to the ability of
the country to market its resources in exchange for advanced
technology and respect from industrial nations. This suggests that
the FSIA is unworkable and unsatisfactory for use in litigation
involving Third World parties. As long as courts are saddled with
the statute, they will continue to avoid political problems by construing the statute narrowly. Congress should consider this dilemma and modify the statutory language or repeal the statute
entirely. Repealing the FSIA would place the foreign policy determinations back in the hands of the executive resulting in greater
flexibility without forced judicial statutory interpretations. Short
of repealing the FSIA, Congress should contemplate changing the
jurisdictional standard from consideration of commercial acts to a
consideration of the importance of the act to the functions of the
sovereign's government. This standard would still require attention to foreign policy on the part of courts but would allow more
flexibility in sensitive areas than the current statutory language.
Under this standard, the courts would not be forced to make political decisions to fit existing statutory language, as in the two
instant decisions. Considering the political ramifications, the instant courts correctly decided the jurisdictional immunity issues.
Because Congress has placed the courts in this difficult position,
however, future courts will most likely follow the trend in the instant cases and construe the FSIA language more and more narrowly when politically sensitive issues are involved. These contrived statutory interpretations will result in good foreign policy
85. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The drafters indicated that the executive should conduct United States foreign policy rather than the judiciary.
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but bad law.
B. Scope of Antitrust Jurisdiction
In both of the instant cases, foreign sovereign states were either
directly or indirectly involved in private antitrust actions. Strong
policy considerations must be considered in deciding whether
United States antitrust law should apply to foreign nations if jurisdiction is otherwise proper. When the foreign sovereign is one
of the defendants in an antitrust action, as in OPEC, the primary
jurisdictional arguments under the antitrust laws revolve around
whether a foreign sovereign is a "person" for the purposes of the
antitrust statutes. The courts must manipulate the statutory language to formulate their jurisdictional test. The OPEC court refused to extend the Pfizer86 doctrine allowing a foreign sovereign
to be a plaintiff "person" under the antitrust laws by holding that
a foreign sovereign could not be a defendant "person." The court
correctly concluded that to subject a foreign sovereign to United
States antitrust laws would involve judicial invasion into the sensitive inner policies and workings of a foreign sovereign. The political and economic repercussions of permitting the OPEC na87
tions to be sued for antitrust violations could be devastating.
The result reached by this court on both the FSIA and antitrust
jurisdictional issues indicates that the proper means for seeking
redress for alleged abuses in the world oil market is through diplomatic channels, not the United States court system. In the
Pezetel case, antitrust jurisdiction was conferred because there
was no immediate threat to world political and economic systems.
Regulation of the supply of golf carts to the United States is not
as crucial to foreign relations as regulating the behavior of the
OPEC nations in the oil market. Accordingly, the Pezetel court
strictly interpreted the FSIA and the antitrust statutes in exercising jurisdiction over Pezetel. Although Pezetel tried to elevate its
status to that of the Polish government, the court concluded that
involvement on the part of the Polish government vias not extensive enough to make inquiry into the alleged violations by the
United States judiciary improper.
Thus, when faced with foreign anticompetitive activity, domes86. See note 57, supra.
-87. A likely repercussion would be an embargo on oil shipments to the
United States followed by a withdrawal of investment assets from the United
States in order to avoid attachment.
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tic businesses must in effect decide whether the commercial activity is more like regulating golf carts or more like regulating oil
prices in its relation to foreign policy. If the dispute resembles the
OPEC case in its foreign policy ramifications, the court will find
some way to refuse jurisdiction and the domestic plaintiff must
turn to diplomatic channels for relief. If the case involves less
sensitive foreign policy questions, as in Pezetel, the court will interpret the FSIA and the antitrust statutes literally in order to
exercise jurisdiction. Domestic businesses face uncertainty in litigation because the jurisdiction question is based on the outcome
of the court's foreign policy analysis. The unwillingness on the
part of the courts to exercise jurisdiction over commercial activity
that might have foreign policy overtones is directly opposed to
the intent of the drafters of the FSIA to depoliticize sovereign
immunity decisions. 8 Thus, in the area of extraterritorial antitrust law, it seems appropriate for Congress to reconsider the
FSIA and become sensitive to the jurisdictional struggles that
face the courts. Congress must face the essential question whether
the courts are suited to make political decisions in foreign policy
areas.
V.

CONCLUSION

Under current law, state-owned entities that conduct business
within the United States may be sued for violations of the antitrust statutes, but foreign sovereign states are not amenable to
direct antitrust actions.89 Antitrust disputes with foreign nations
will most likely be resolved by diplomatic means as the courts
attempt to avoid involvement in sensitive areas of foreign relations. The instant cases, however, have a wider applicability than
merely extraterritorial antitrust cases. These cases reflect caution
on the part of the courts in dealing with foreign policy questions.
More importantly, these cases demonstrate the serious problems
that courts have in interpreting and implementing the FSIA, suggesting that Congress has given the judiciary responsibilities in
88. See note 15, supra.
89. It must be noted that the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue concerning the amenability of a foreign sovereign to suit under the antitrust laws
and the FSIA. Thus, OPEC and Pezetel are the only cases to date in this area.
The OPEC case has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit United States Court of
Appeals. Plaintiffs filed their first brief March 21, 1980, in IAM v. Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 79-3693.

Fall 1980]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

855

the foreign relations realm that it should not have. Both cases
also point out how courts will use the statutory language of the
antitrust statutes in addition to the FSIA to effectuate jurisdictional policy in extraterritorial antitrust actions. The cases indicate that courts will use narrow statutory interpretations to avoid
potentially politically embarrassing, yet legally correct, results.
This trend indicates that future litigants with politically explosive
issues will be forced by the court's jurisdictional manipulations to
seek relief through diplomatic channels, thus reaching the correct
result by incorrect means.
Martin L. Lagod

